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Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential
Regulation: Are Capitai Requirements Enough?
By THOMAS F . HELLMANN, KEVIN C . MURDOCK, AND JOSEPH E . STIGLITZ*
In a dynamic model of moral hazard, competition can undermine prudent bank
behavior. While capital-requirement regulation can induce prudent behavior, the
policy yields Pareto-inefficient outcomes. Capital requirements reduce gambling
incentives by putting bank equity at risk. However, they also have a perverse effect
of harming banks' franchise values, thus encouraging gambling. Pareto-efficient
outcomes can be achieved by adding deposit-rate controls as a regulatory instru-
ment, since they facilitate prudent investment by increasing franchise values. Even
if deposit-rate ceilings are not binding on the equilibrium path, they may be useful
in deterring gambling off the equilibrium path. (JEL G2. E4, L5)
Banking crises are pervasive. In the last two
decades, the frequency of severe banking crises
has increased significantly. Banking crises are
important not just because of the devastation
that they bring to one particular sector of the
economy, but because typically the shock
waves affect the entire economy. In the nine-
teenth century, most of the U.S. economy's
economic downturns were related to financial
panics. The budgetary consequences for gov-
ernments, which often bear a significant part of
tbe costs of the bailout, cannot be ignored ei-
ther. A compilation of cases over tbe past two
decades by the World Bank shows costs ranging
up to 40 percent of GDP. Probably the best
known examples are the savings and loan
* Helltnann: Graduate School of Business, Stanford Uni-
versity, Stanford, CA 94305: Murdock: Graduate School of
Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, and
McKinsey & Company, 21 South Clark Street, Chicago, IL
60603: Stiglitz: The World Bank, 1818 H Street. NW,
Washington, DC 20433, and on leave from the Department
of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305.
We thank Masahiko Aoki, Sudipto Bhattacharya. Jerry
Caprio, Serdar Dini;, John Roberts, Paul Romer, two anon-
ymous referees, and seminar participants at the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, the University of Mannheim,
Stanford University Department of Economics and Gradu-
ate School of Business, ttie William Davidson Institute at
the University of Michigan, and the World Bank. Any
remaining errors are ours. This paper represents the views of
the authors and does not necessarily represent that of any
organization wjtti which they are or have been affiliated.
(S&L) crisis in the United States, which re-
sulted in estimated losses of $180 billion or 3.2
percent of GDP, and the ongoing banking crisis
in Japan, where some estimates of nonperform-
ing loans approach 25 percent of GDP.'
Prudential regulation is meant to protect the
banking system from these problems. Tradition-
ally, it has consisted of a mixture of monitoring
individual transactions (ensuring, for instance,
that adequate collateral was put up), regulations
concerning self-dealing, capital requirements,
and entry restrictions. In some countries, restric-
tions were placed on lending in particular areas:
many East Asian countries, for example, used to
have restrictions on real estate lending.^ Finally,
many countries imposed interest-rate restric-
tions.^ Concerns about bank runs also led many
countries to provide deposit insurance and to
' Typically, recovery rates on nonperfonning loans are
less than 50 percent. If this holds true for Japan, losses could
exceed 10 percent of GDP.
^ The intent of these restrictions was only partially to
enhance the safety and soundness of the banking system;
these restrictions were also intended to direct credit toward
what were viewed at the time as more productive invest-
ments.
^ Interest-rate restrictiotis, like many of the other restric-
tions, served several other objectives; low interest rates had
significant positive effects on government budgets in peri-
ods in which the debt GDP ratio was high, such as after
World War II. We discuss this in Hellrtiann and Murdock
(1997) atid Helltnann et al. (1997, 1998a).
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establish central banks to serve as lenders of last
resort.
Over the past decade, several changes in the
systems of prudential regulation have occurred.
First, given the increased number and complex-
ity of transactions, there has been greater em-
phasis on monitoring banks' risk-management
systems, and less emphasis on monitoring indi-
vidual transactions. Second, in a wave of
financial-market liberalization, interest rates
have been deregulated, and restrictions on the
asset choices of banks have been lifted. Third,
greater emphasis has been placed on capital
requirements, typically using the Bank of Inter-
national Settlements (BIS) standards of the
Basle Accord.
As these changes have occurred, financial
crises have become more frequent (see Gerard
Caprio, Jr. and Daniela Klingebiel, 1997; Klaus
P. Fischer and Martin Chenard, 1997). Most
observers agree that moral hazard plays an im-
portant role in these failures. Edward Kane
(1989) and Rebel A. Cole et al. (1995) docu-
ment the problem of "gambling on resurrec-
tion": banks choose a risky asset portfolio that
pays out high profits or bonuses if the gamble
succeeds but leaves depositors, or their insurers,
with the losses if the gamble fails.* It has been
suggested that deposit insurance is the problem,
since it reduces the incentives for depositors to
monitor."^ Others have argued that it makes little
difference whether countries bave a formal sys-
tem of deposit insurance since, in the event of a
financial crisis, there will be a bailout.*" More-
over, the fact that there have been financial
crises in countries with and without formal
deposit-insurance systems suggests that elimi-
nating formal deposit insurance by itself does
not solve the problem.
"• George A. Akerlof and Paul M, Romer (1993) farther
elaborate on the moral hazard, arguing that banks may use
fraudulent lending practices (such as insider lending) lo
"loot" banks. In this case bank managers extract value out of
the banks even if this leads to insolvency.
^ One may question, however, hoth the efficacy and
desirability of depositor monitoring, given that monitoring
is a public good. See Stiglitz (1985. 1992, 1994) and the
discussion in our working paper (Heltmann et al., 1998b).
^ As one commentator quipped, there are two kinds of
countries: those that have deposit insurance, and those that
don't yet know that they have it.
This paper asks whether financial liberaliza-
tion itself could be part of the problem. Some
recent empirical studies suggest it may be: large
interest-rate increases, which are associated
with financial-market liberalization, are also
systematically related to financial crises (see
Asli Demirguij-Kunt and Enrica Detragiache,
1997, 1998). This paper approaches the ques-
tion from a theoretical perspective. Financial-
market liberalization increases competition;
competition erodes profits; lower profits imply
lower franchise values (i.e.. the capitalized
value of expected future profits); and lower
franchise values lower incentives for making
good loans, increasing the moral-hazard prob-
lem. With sufficient competition banks will find
it desirable to gamble. There is thus an incon-
sistency of interest-rate liberalization and pru-
dential bank behavior.
We ask whether an increase in capital re-
quirements can offset the adverse effects of
liberalization. If banks hold sufficient capital,
they internalize the adverse consequences of
gambling and thus will choose to invest pru-
dently. While it is possible to combat moral
hazard with capital requirements, we find that
banks must be forced to hold an inefficiently
high amount of capital. It is impossible to im-
plement any Pareto-efficient outcome using just
capital requirements as the too! of prudential
regulation. That is, freely determined deposit
rates are inconsistent with Pareto efficiency.
We then ask whether there is any way to
implement outcomes along the Pareto frontier.
The reason why capital requirements alone are
insufficient is because, with freely determined
deposit rates, banks have excessive incentive to
compete for deposits by offering higher rates.
Capital requirements only become effective
when they raise banks' costs sufficiently to im-
pact the banks' willingness to pay out high
deposit rates. But if capital requirements are an
indirect way of lowering deposit rates, why not
control deposit rates in the first place? Indeed,
we show that any Pareto-efficient outcome can
be implemented by a combination of deposit-
rate controls and capital requirements.
The benefit of deposit-rate controls for pro-
moting stability in the banking sector seems to
have been intuitively understood by regulators.
In discussing the "Temporary Interest Rate Ad-
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justment Law" of 1947, which regulated Japa-
nese deposit rates, Yoshio Suzuki (1987 p. 41)
notes:
Of course, the purpose of this law was to
prevent interest rate competition that was
destructive to the profitability of financial
institutions. That is, the law aimed more
at ensuring stable business condition for
financial institutions through external
controls on competition than at ensuring
prudent management of such institutions
based on intemai controls.
Similarly, in the United States one of the main
regulatory changes preceding the S&L crisis
was the abolition of regulation Q, which had
imposed deposit-rate controls. Michael C. Kee-
ley (1990) finds a direct relationship among
reforms that increased competition, the reduc-
tion in franchise value of banks, and an increase
in the number of bank failures during the 198O's
in the United States.
One view of the recent financial crises in East
Asia and the weakened financial system in Ja-
pan is that the problems arose at least in part as
a result of financial-market liberalization.'' First,
financial-market liberalization reduced barriers
to entry and increased competition: more for-
eign banks were allowed in the country; restric-
tions on opening branches were reduced; and
where there were deposit-rate ceilings, these
were either eliminated or reduced. All these
reduced profitability and thus franchise value of
existing domestic banks. Second, other aspects
of the liberalization agenda reduced restrictions
imposed on banks. A range of new activities
that had previously been precluded, such as
many derivative trades and foreign currency
transactions, opened up many new ways for
banks to engage in gambling activities. More-
over, restrictions on real estate lending were
eliminated.^ Third, at the same time that finan-
cial liberalization undermined franchise value
and opened up new gambling opportunities, few
compensatory actions were taken to strengthen
regulatory oversight. Capital requirements were
not increased, and other instruments of pruden-
tial control were eliminated. The capabilities of
the agencies in charge of regulatory oversight
were not upgraded, and in fact, they frequently
declined.^
In our model we examine the moral-hazard
problem of banks in a dynamic setting. Banks
can either invest in a prudent asset yielding high
expected returns or in an inefficient gambling
asset that can yield high private returns for the
bank if the gamble pays off but imposes costs
on depositors if the gamble fails. If markets are
sufficiently competitive, the bank earns rela-
tively little from prudent investment, but the
bank can always capture a one-period rent from
gambling. Thus increased competition tends to
promote gambling in the banking sector.
Some form of prudential regulation is then
necessary to induce banks to invest prudently.
Capital requirements force banks to have more
of their own capital at risk so that they internal-
ize the inefficiency of gambling. Clearly, once
banks have enough of their own capital in-
vested, banks can be induced to invest in the
prudent asset. This paper develops an alterna-
tive form of prudential regulation: the use of
deposit-rate ceilings to create franchise value
for banks. Franchise value is the discounted
stream of future profits for the bank, a value that
can only be captured if the banks stays in op-
eration. If the bank gambles and fails, it loses its
franchise value. Franchise value acts as intan-
gible capital, which can be a substitute for tan-
gible capital. If a bank has sufficient franchise
value, it will choose to invest in the prudent
asset.
Given two potentially effective forms of
' For further discussion on the dynamics underlying ihe
crises in East Asia in 1997, see Steven Radelet and Jeffrey
D. Sachs (1998) and James Tobin (1998).
" Real estate lending expands the opportunity for exces-
sive risk taking. This is because there may be great volatility
in the underlying land prices. To the extent that it is difficult
to ascertain the market value of real estate assets, financial
institutions can also obfuscate the value of their capital
(particularly when banks do not mark to market) because
banks can sell assets that have increased in value but hold
on to assets that have decreased in value.
^ For example in Thailand (and elsewhere too) the rapid
increases in salaries in the private sector, combined with
liscal constraints on public authorities, led to a mismatch
between public and private salaries, and the central banks
and government lost many of their most talented people to
the private sector.
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prudential regulation, this paper seeks to deter-
mine the optimal form of prudential regulation.
The Pareto frontier is given by the lowest level
of capital for each level of deposit rates, which
is consistent with the bank's cboosing to invest
in the prudent asset,
To see why it impossible to have a Pareto-
efficient equilibrium where banks freely deter-
mine deposit rates, consider the incentives of a
bank where all of its competitors are choosing
to offer the Pareto-efficient deposit rate. Along
the Pareto frontier, the bank is exactly indiffer-
ent between gambling and the prudent asset
(i.e., the total profits that the bank earns on a
fixed amount of deposits are identical). Then, it
must be the case that the bank earns a higher
expected margin on the gambling asset than on
the prudent asset because, wben the bank gam-
bles, it will forfeit its franchise value should the
gamble fail. If this bank offered the same de-
posit rate as its competitors, it would invest in
the prudent asset and get its market share. If,
however, the bank were to offer a slightly
higher deposit rate, it would capture additional
deposits, upon which it could earn a higher
margin if it were to gamble. Because of tbe
market-stealing effect, each individual bank has
an incentive to defect from any candidate equi-
librium along the Pareto frontier. We thus find
that freely determined deposit rates are incon-
sistent with Pareto efficiency.
The response that this paper focuses on is the
use of deposit-rate controls to create franchise
value. Deposit-rate ceilings effectively combat
this market-stealing effect by precluding banks
from competing through inefficiently high de-
posit rates. We show that, with an appropriate
ceiling in place, all Pareto-efficient outcomes
can be implemented.
Our results suggest that there is a clear theo-
retical connection between liberalization and
the degree of tbe moral-hazard problem. We
find that freely determined deposit rates are
inconsistent with Pareto efficiency. Banks offer
inefficiently high deposit rates in an effort to
steal share from their rivals. Liberalization usu-
ally has a stated goal of increasing competition
in the financial sector. This will have the effect
of increasing the interbank elasticity of deposits
while having a more modest, if any, effect on
Ihe total elasticity of deposits. This increase in
the interbank elasticity will increase market-
stealing incentives, and this creates the link
between liberalization and financial crises.
Of course, the policy we study in detail in this
paper (deposit-rate ceilings) is not the only pol-
icy that could be used to generate improvements
over using capital requirements alone. Other
policy instruments that the government could
apply include asset-class restrictions, entry re-
strictions, and enhancing direct supervision.
The goal of each of these policies is either to
limit the scope of the bank's ability to engage in
moral-hazard behavior or to increase the posi-
tive incentives of the bank to invest prudently.
Determining the optimal application of all of
these policies is beyond the scope of this paper;
the point of the paper is first to show the inad-
equacy of capital requirements alone, and sec-
ond to identify the potential value of including
deposit-rate ceilings as an instrument of pruden-
tial regulation.
We discuss some of these broader policy issues
in previous work {Hellmann et al., 1996, 1997,
1998a; Hellmann and Murdock, 1997). In those
papers, we consider a framework of financial-
market regulation. We propose a set of policies
that we term "financial restraint," which we dis-
tinguish from financial repression. An important
difference is that with financial restraint,
interest-rate controls are used to improve the effi-
ciency of private financial markets (as shown in
the current paper), whereas with financial repres-
sion, interest rates are typically a mechanism for
the government to extract rents fixjm the private
sector.
The theoretical model builds on the work of
Sudipto Bhattacharya (1982), which noted the
usefulness of deposit-rate controls in a simple
static model.'° (Zaprio and Lawrence H. Sum-
mers (1996) emphasize the importance of fran-
chise value for prudential regulation." The
analysis of capital requirements is related to
Jean-Claude Rochet (1992), who explains how
'" Bruce D. Smith (1984) also has a model where deposit-
rate controls reduce the likelihood of financial instability. In his
mode! deposit-rate controls eliminate an instability problem h.
la Michael Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
" Keeley (1990), Steven R. Weisbrod et al. (1992), and
Rebecca S. Demsetz et al. (1996) provide empirical evi-
dence from the United States and Japan.
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capital requirements affect the incentives for
gambling. ^ In the analysis, we abstract from
some of the other criticism of capital require-
ments, such as the fact that they fail to recog-
nize all relevant risk (see Mathias Dewatripont
and Jean Tirole [1994] for a more comprehen-
sive treatment).'^
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows: In Section I, the model is introduced.
We then examine competitive equilibria and
develop conditions under which gambling oc-
curs in equilibrium in Section II. Section III
develops the instruments of prudential regu-
lation and highlights the trade-offs between
using capital requirements and deposit-rate
controls. Section IV introduces the distinction
between binding and nonbinding deposit-rate
controls and shows how nonbinding ceilings
can limit the equilibrium-path behavior by
gambling banks to promote prudent out-
comes. In Section V, we consider how intro-
ducing endogenous rates of return creates
feedback effects that strengthen our conclu-
sions from the basic model. Concluding re-
marks follow in Section VI.
1. The Model
Consider a bank that operates for T periods.
In each period, the bank offers an interest rate
on deposits of r^ in competition with other
banks which offer depositors interest rates r_j.
The total volume of deposits mobilized by the
bank is />(r,, r_j), with the volume of deposits
increasing in the bank's own interest rate and
decreasing in the competitors' rate (£>, > 0,
Depositors have deposit insurance, so the
volume of deposits depends only on the interest
'^Note, however, that Chun H. Lam and Andrew H.
Chen (1985), Gerard Genone and David Pyle (1991), and
David Besanko and George Katanas (1996) show that, in
some circumstances, capital requirements may actually in-
crease the portfolio risk.
'^ Criticisms include that (i) they induce rigidities in the
adjustment process; (ii) they typically are implemented by
examining risk on an asset-by-asset basis, ignoring correla-
tions; and (iii) they often focus on credil risk, ignoring
market risks.
'""The only additional assumption on the demand func-
tion is that it satisfies concavity of the bank's value function.
rates offered,'^ In our judgment, the assumption
of deposit insurance best reflects reality. Note,
however, that our results do not depend on this
assumption. In our working paper version (Hell-
mann et al., 1998b), we show that all of our
qualitative results continue to hold in an envi-
ronment without deposit insurance.
After funds have been raised, the bank allo-
cates its assets, wherein the bank faces a moral-
hazard problem in choosing its loan portfolio.
For simplicity, we assume that the bank may
choose between two assets: the prudent asset,
yielding a retum a; and the gambling asset,
yielding a retum of y with probability 0 and ^
with probability 1 - d. The pmdent asset has
higher expected return {a > dy + (\ - 0)/3),
but if the gamble succeeds the bank eams higher
private retum (7 > a). The bank invests both
the deposits it mobilizes and its own capital k,
which is expressed as a percentage of the de-
posits mobilized so that the total assets invested
equal (1 -F k)D(r^, r_,).
The opportunity cost of that capital is p.'^ In
this section we assume that p is exogenous and
that p> a (i.e., bank capital is costly). A simple
revealed-preference argument suggests that the
case of p > a is the relevant one. If capital truly
had no opportunity cost, then the problem of
moral hazard in banking would not be so prev-
alent as it remains today, because regulators
would simply ensure that banks hold sufficient
capital to induce prudent investment, and banks
would willingly comply. In Section V we de-
velop this argument further. We examine an
extension of the model where p is determined
endogenousiy as the equilibrium rate of retum
that clears the market for bank equity capital.
Without capital requirements capital is not
costly (i.e.. p = a), but banks will typically hold
either too little capital or none at all, A binding
'•^  We do not explicitly model the fees paid by banks for
deposit insurance, although our results hold for any fixed fee
for insurance. Yuk-Shee Chan et al. (1992) and Ronald
Gianmarino et al. (1993) show how more sophisticated fee
schemes can be used to reduce moral hazard.
"^  We can think of the cost of capital as the dilution cost
to the owners. Equity investors know the expected returns of
the bank in every period (which may depend on whether the
bank will gamble or not, which outside equity investors can
rationally anticipate). They will provide capital if the ex-
pected retum on investment equals their opportunity cost p.
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capital requirement, however, increases the de-
mand for capital, endogenously making capital
costly (i.e., p > a).^^
Banks are subject to prudential regulation by
the government. At the end of each period, the
regulator inspects the balance sheet of all banks.
If a bank has negative equity (i.e., the bank
cannot repay all its depositors in full), its fran-
chise is revoked. Thus, if a bank were to gamble
and the gamble fails, then the bank will lose its
franchise and cease operation.'^ In this econ-
omy with an (ex post) perfectly informed regu-
lator there are no "zombie" banks "gambling on
their resurrection" (see Kane, 1989) that have
negative equity and are hoping that a successful
gamble will return them to solvency. The reg-
ulator, however, cannot perfectly monitor the ex
ante investment portfolio of the bank. This is
consistent with the shift in regulator structure to
monitoring the risk-management system of the
bank rather than examining each individual fi-
nancial transaction.
The per-period profits of the bank when it
chooses the prudent asset are 7rp(r,, r_,, k) =
mp(r,. k)D(rj, r_,), where mp(r,, k) = a(\ +
k) — pk — r, is the effective profit margin that
the bank earns on each unit of deposit, net of its
cost of capital. When the bank gambles, per-
period profits are 7rQ(r,, r_^. k) = /MGC'*!'
k)D(ri, r_^), where mG(r,, k) = 0(7(1 +
^) ~ '*,) ~ pk. The gambling margin depends
on whether the gamble is successful. If so, then
the bank captures a high return on assets and
repays its depositors. If the gamble fails, then
the bank is closed down by the regulator.
Banks maximize their expected discounted
profits, V = 2,^^ 0 ^''^r Following Douglas W.
Diamond (1989) we will look at the limit as 7"—>
=0. Banks will thus choose strategies corre-
" Gary Gorton and Andrew Winton (1997) also derive
thai bank capital is costly endogenously in a general-
equilibrium model.
"* This assumes that the return earned by the bank when
the gamble fails is insufficient to repay depositors, it is
straightforward to show that this assumption is always sat-
isfied when a bank chooses to gamble in equilibrium be-
cause the gambling asset has a lower expected return ihan
the prudent asset. It is only when the bank can impose a cost
on depositors (or, more specifically, the deposit insurer) that
the private expected return to the bank is higher from
gambling.
sponding to the infinitely repeated static Nash
equilibrium.
The timing of the stage game works as fol-
lows: Banks simultaneously choose their own
level of capital and offer a deposit rate. Depos-
itors then choose the bank in which to place
their funds. Banks then choose their asset port-
folio. Finally, returns are realized, and the reg-
ulator inspects the balance sheet of the bank.
II. Competitive Equilibria witb Gambling
Before comparing different forms of pruden-
tial regulation, it is worthwhile to determine
whether any regulation is indeed necessary, in
particular, the purpose of this section is to de-
termine conditions under which banks would
choose to gamble in equilibrium. The expected
return from the prudent asset is Vp(r ,^ r_,,
k) = TTp(r,, r_,, k)/(\ — 5), while the ex-
pected return from the gambling asset is VcCr^ ,
r_^, k) - TTc(r^, r_i, k)l(\ - 88). The
investment process by banks occurs in two stag-
es: the deposit mobilization stage and the asset-
allocation stage. At the allocation stage, banks
have D(r, r_,) units of deposits to invest with
an interest-rate cost of r. Banks will choose to
invest in the prudent asset if Vp(r, r_,, k) ^
V^i^r, r_,, k), and they will invest in the gam-
bling asset otherwise. From this relationship,
we can develop a "no-gambling condition"
which determines the threshold interest rate at
which gambling will occur, namely.
TT (r r lr\ — TT (r r Jf^
This constraint is intuitive. The one-period rent
(TTQ — TTp) that the bank expects to earn from
" W e should note that our model has a static structure
within each investment period. There is a growing literature
of papers (Charles W. Calomiris and Charles M. Kahn,
1991; Mark J. Flannery. 1994) that has a richer dynamic
structure within each investment period. This matters most
in a world without deposit insurance, where one would want
to analyze the role of demand deposits and the potential
disciplinary role of the interim withdrawal by depositors.
This literature generally finds that interim monitoring by
demand depositors can mitigate but not fully eliminate
problems of moral hazard.
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gambling must be less than the lost franchise
value (SVf,) that the bank gives up if the gamble
fails (with probability I — 6). From this we can
determine the critical deposit interest rate, r(k),
such that for r < r(k) the bank will choose to
invest in the prudent asset (assuming a symmet-
ric equilibrium in deposit rates):
= [a(\ - pk]E/(e + 1).
+ 6 [ a ( l + k ) - p k ] .
When the bank is farsighted (as 6 —* I), the
bank can pay out a deposit interest rate that
approaches the bank's net return on assets
(Q[1 + k] - pk) and still choose to invest in
the prudent asset. This is sensible because as
6 —> 1 the bank only cares about average per-
period returns, so the bank would never engage
in a gambling activity that returns a finite pos-
itive one-period rent at the risk of losing all
future returns. Once the bank is less than per-
fectly farsighted, however, the bank must eam a
sufficiently large positive profit each period so
that its franchise value at risk is greater than the
expected returns from gambling.^*'
Given the bank's asset-allocation decision,
we can turn to how banks compete in the market
for deposits. We will assume that, if a compet-
itive equilibrium with no gambling exists, then
that is the equilibrium that will be selected by
the banks. If a bank intends to invest in the
prudent asset, then it will choose
(rp, kp) = argmax,.i.{Vp(r, r.^, k)}.
For a symmetric equilibrium (i.e., r_i = rp),
using the tirst-order condition (dVp/dr^ ^ 0),
we have
p, k) = D(rp, rp)/(dD(rp,
which implicitly defines rp(k). Using e =
drj)(rlD), we have
^^  The remaining comparative statics on the no-gambling
condition are immediate: dribct > 0, Hrliiy < 0. df/d6 <
0. The no-gambling condition becomes les.s stringent as the
prudent asset is more attractive, and more stringent as the
gambling asset is more attractive.
Because BVp/dk = - ( p - a)D(r, r_,)/(l -
5) < 0, increasing a bank's capital only re-
duces the bank's expected profits, and so the
bank will choose to minimize its own capital
that it invests. Thus, in the competitive equilib-
rium, if the bank were to choose the prudent
asset, then rp(O) = ae/(e -I- 1). As competi-
tion for deposits becomes sufficiently intense
(i.e., as a -> oc), then the competitive deposit
rate approaches a, with the result that the fran-
chise value of the bank becomes arbitrarily
small. But as discussed above, once the deposit
rate exceeds a critical threshold [rp(k) > r\k)],
the bank earns greater expected returns from
gambling than from investing in the prudent
asset, and thus no equilibrium where all banks
choose to invest in the prudent asset can exist.
If we turn our attention to the case where the
bank invests in the gambling asset, we can
repeat the preceding logic to show that
, k) -
implying that
k) - (pk/e)]s/(E -\- 1).
As above.
= -ip - ey)D(r, - 80) < 0
so no bank would voluntarily hold capital.
The above argument is summarized in the
following proposition. Let e = r(O)/[a —
PROPOSITION 1: Eor sufficiently competitive
markets (i.e., e > e). the only symmetric equi-
librium has banks choosing to hold no capital,
pay rQ(O) to depositors, and invest in the gam-
bling asset.
in. Prudential Regulation
Once markets are sufficiently competitive
that gambling must occur in the free-market
competitive equilibrium, some form of pruden-
tial regulation is necessary. A consensus has
emerged among both economists and policy
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makers that a minimum capital requirement
combined with effective monitoring of banks by
a central regulator forms an effective basis for
prudential regulation of banks. The underlying
logic of capital requirements is that when the
bank invests its own capital that capital acts as
a bond, so that the bank bears some of the
downside risk from investing in risky assets.
(We call this the capital-at-risk effect.) Provided
that the bank has sufficient capital at risk, the
bank will choose to invest in the prudent asset in
equilibrium.
An alternative form of prudential regulation
is deposit-rate controls, creating a ceiling on the
interest rate that banks may pay to depositors.
By limiting the degree of competition in the
deposit market, a deposit-rate control will in-
crease the per-period profits captured by each
bank, thereby increasing the franchise value. As
described in Section II, once the franchise value
at risk exceeds the one-period expected gain
from gambling, the bank will choose to invest in
the prudent asset.
To implement an effective policy of capital
requirements (i.e., one that eliminates gambling
as a competitive equilibrium), it must be the
case that no profitable deviation to gambling is
available to any bank. If banks are required to
hold k of capita], then the equilibrium interest
rate, assuming that all banks invest in the pru-
dent asset, will be r^(k). If a bank were consid-
ering a deviation, then it would choose its
deposit rate to maximize its retum, conditional
on all other banks paying rp(k) and the bank
investing in the gambling asset. For this devia-
tion not to be profitable, and thus ensuring that
a capital requirement of k will implement a
no-gambling equilibrium, it must be the case
that Max.lVJr. r^, k)] < Vp(rp, rp, fc).^'
Define k as the minimum level of capital that
satisfies the constraint. We know that k exists
because, for sufficiently large k, the bank bears
enough of the cost of gambling that its returns
are strictly greater when it invests in the prudent
asset. We can determine the comparative statics
^' For notational simplicity, when writing rp{k), r^J^k),
and r(it) as arguments of a function, we will suppress the
fact that eacb of these depends on the level of capital
deployed by the bank and write rp, r^, and r [i.e., Vp(rp, rp,
k) = Vp(/-p(i). rp(t). k)\.





Since financial liberalization grants greater free-
dom to banks in determining their lending port-
folio, we would expect that either 7 or 0 (or
both) would increase. This raises the possibility
that the minimum effective capital requirement
may increase as liberalization is introduced.^^
Implementing an effective policy of deposit-
rate controls is relatively straightforward. Since
for all r s f(k) it is optimal for the bank to
invest in the prudent asset, then any deposit-rate
control of f(k) in combination with a minimum
capital requirement of k will implement a no-
gambling equilibrium.^ "* Furthermore, even if
no capital requirements are used, a deposit-rate
ceiling of r(0) will suffice. This leads naturally
to Proposition 2.
PROPOSITION 2: Any Pareto-efficient out-
come can be implemented by a combination of a
minimum capital requirement of k* with a
deposit-rate control of f-(k*).
The income for the banks, depositors, and the
government (as the deposit insurer) are deter-
mined as a function of the deposit rate, the level
of capital held by banks, and whether the banks
gamble or invest prudently. The Pareto frontier
is defined by the set of outcomes such that no
agent (bank, depositor, or the government) can
^^This is potentially an important observation. One of
the objectives of the Basle Accord was lo create a "level
playing field" for inlemational competition. Yel if banks in
different countries face different gambling opportunities
and different degrees of competilion, the optima! capital
requirement will not be the same across countries.
^^ Normally, we think of deposit-rate controls as deposit-
rate ceilings. If A* > k. where k = [r^ik) = r(k)], then
in a competitive equilibrium with a deposit-rate ceiling but
no floor, banks would offer an interest rate that is less than
rik"). To implement the constrained social optimum, the
regulator also would need lo impose a deposit-rate floor of
r(it*) along with a capital requirement oi k*.
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FIGURE 1. NO-GAMBLING REGION
AND COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA
Notes: The line designated P(k) is the no-gambling condi-
tion, and the line designated rp(k) is the equilibrium deposit
rate conditional on prudent investment; rp(k) above f(k)
cannot be implemented, because banks strictly prefer gam-
bling to pmdent investment in this region.
be made better off witbout some other becom-
ing worse off. Within the no-gambling region,
the first part of the Pareto frontier is defined by
the vertical axis under r(0) [i.e., all r < r(0)].
(See Figure 1, where the no-gambling condition
is upward sloping [i.e., when df/dk > 0].)
When examining the no-gambling condition,
we find, however, that it is not necessarily
upward sloping:
dr/dk = (1 - 8)ia - ey)/(\ - d)
- S{p - a)
which implies that df^/dk < 0 for S >: S = (a -
07)/[a - 07 + (1 - 9)(p - a)]. This finding
implies that, for farsighted banks, increasing the
amount of capital held by the bank actually
increases the bank's incentives to gamble. This
runs counter to the intuition traditionally found
in the literature (see Bhattacharya, 1982). The
traditional analysis has focused on the static role
of bank capital. The greater the amount of the
bank's own equity at risk, the greater is the
extent to which the bank internalizes the cost of
gambling. This static analysis has failed to in-
clude the dynamic effect of capital requirements
on a bank's franchise value. Since holding cap-
ital is costly, the per-period future profits of the
bank are lower, ceteris paribus, when bank cap-
ital increases. Thus, increasing the amount of
capital held by the bank has two effects: the
positive capital-at-risk effect and the negative
franchise-value effect. This discussion is sum-
marized in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3: When banks are suffi-
ciently farsighted (S < 5 < 1), the negative
franchise-value effect dominates the positive
capital'Ut-risk effect of capital requirements.
Consequently, there always exists a policy of
deposit-rate controls that Pareto-dominates
any policy of capital requirements.
The Pareto-dominance result follows natu-
rally from the condition that banks are far-
sighted because the no-gambling constraint is
downward sloping. For any positive capital
requirement, then, the interest rate realized is
less than that obtained by simply using a
deposit-rate eontrol without a capital require-
ment [i.e., r{k) < r(0)]. A deposit-rate con-
trol of f'{k), combined with no capital
requirement, would yield the same returns to
depositors and higher profits to banks, which
would save banks the incremental capital
costs ([p - a]k). Whenever banks are suffi-
ciently farsighted that the franchise-value ef-
fect dominates the capital-at-risk effect, then
any policy of capital requirements is a Pareto-
inferior policy. Under these circumstances,
the optimal capital requirement is always
zero. For the remainder of the paper, we will
assume that banks are sufficiently myopic that
the no-gambling condition is upward sloping
(i.e., dfldk > 0), where it is possible that the
optimal capital requirement can be positive.
All of our results will also hold for the case
when the no-gambling condition is downward
sloping.
We have shown that we can always implement
the constrained optimum using both capital
requirements and deposit-rate controls. We
now consider whether there are circumstances un-
der which we can implement the optimum using
just capital requirements and no deposit-rate
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controls—the set of policies usually associated
with financial liberalization.
With no deposit-rate controls, banks can
freely choose their deposit rates. To under-
stand the effectiveness of using just a capital
requirement, it is important to understand a
bank's incentives to deviate by offering a
different interest rate and switching its loan
portfolio to the gambling asset. Define k by
M^) ^ ^(^)' Lemma 1, which is proved in
the Appendix, derives from the fact that, at k,
the bank has an incentive to deviate by offer-
ing a higher interest rate and switching to the
gambling asset.
LEMMA 1: The minimum effective capital re-
quirement is strictly greater than k (i.e., k > k).
The intuition for Lemma 1 comes from the
difference between how the no-gambling con-
dition is determined in comparison to how the
equilibrium interest rate is determined. The
no-gambling condition is determined such
that the bank has no incentive to gamble at the
asset-allocation stage. The bank thus consid-
ers its return from gambling and prudent in-
vesting, conditional on having a fixed pool of
deposits to invest. For the bank to be indif-
ferent between investing in the prudent versus
the gambling asset (which is the definition of
r), then the bank's current-period expected
margin must be strictly greater from the gam-
bling asset; that is,
= mp(l - - S) >
When we consider the deposit-mobilization
stage, the bank therefore has a greater incentive
to mobilize deposits when it is gambling than
when it invests prudently, because it earns a
higher expected margin on its incremental
deposits.
For any capital requirement greater than k,
the equilibrium interest rate is strictly inside the
efficient frontier because rp(k) is downward
sloping. This implies that there exists some
lower level of capital, /CQ, such that f(ki^) =
rp(k) (see Figure 2). Thus, as an alternative to a
capital requirement of k, we could use a
deposit-rate control of r(/;o) combined with a





FIGURE 2. PARETO IMPROVEMENTS
WITH DEPOSIT-RATE CONTROLS
Notes: The line de.signated r(*) is the no-gambling condi-
tion, and the line designated rp(A) is the equilibrium deposit
rale conditional on prudent investment and no deposit-rate
ceiling. A deposit-rate ceiling or r = r^ii.) yields the same
return and allows the government to reduce the capital
requirement from k to *„ while still inducing prudent in-
vestmeni by the banks.
icy would yield an identical return to depositors
while increasing the profits of the banks. Prop-
osition 4 summarizes this result.
PROPOSITION 4: There always exists a pol-
icy regime consisting of both a capital require-
ment and a deposit-rate control that Pareto-
dominates any policy regime that only uses a
capital requirement.
This is a strong result. It states that the current
policy regime practiced in most countries
around the world (i.e., using just a capital re-
quirement with no deposit-rate control) is a
Pareto-inferior policy choice.
As long as a positive capital requirement is
necessary to induce the prudent outcome, the
capital-requirement-only regime is Pareto inef-
ficient. This is particularly important for analyz-
ing an alternative proposal for creating
franchise value: the use of entry restrictions.
Lowering the number of banks competing with
each other has a qualitatively similar effect to
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reducing the interbank elasticity of deposits.^*
This, in tum, will increase the equilibrium fran-
chise value of the bank. It does not, however,
allow the implementation of a Pareto-efticient
outcome. As long as banks can freely determine
deposit rates, each bank has a positive incentive
to raise deposit rates along the Pareto frontier.
Since entry restrictions do not affect the bank's
deposit-rate-setting ability, this incentive prob-
lem precludes implementation of Pareto-
efficient outcomes.
A related issue is that we have so far assumed
that the number of banks in the economy is
exogenously fixed. Clearly, with endogenous
entry, there exists the potential for the franchise
value to be eroded by competition from new
banks. Banks will only enter, however, when
their sunk costs of entry are less than or equal to
the ex post franchise value in the post-entry
equilibrium. If these sunk costs exceed the nec-
essary franchise value to support prudent invest-
ment, endogenous entry has no effect on our
results. If the sunk costs are too low, our results
can still be supported provided that the govern-
ment charges a license fee such that the total
sunk costs (entry costs plus license fee) equal
the franchise value.
Finally, it is also interesting to consider the
case where no capital requirements are used and
regulators rely solely on deposit-rate controls. It
is immediate that deposit-rate controls can only
implement outcomes with /: = 0 and r ^ ''(0),
All these outcomes are Pareto efficient, but they
implement only a subset of the Pareto frontier.
IV. Binding and Nonbinding
Deposit-Rate Ceilings
The results of the previous section develop the
advantages of using deposit-rate ceilings as a
mechanism of prudentiaJ regulation. The experi-
ence of the United States in the l960's and l970's
suggests that there are potential difficulties caused
by the use of deposit-rate ceilings that were not
formally analyzed in our stylized model. In par-
ticular, when banks are precluded from freely de-
termining deposit rates, they may seek to capture
deposits through other forms of non-price compe-
"This can be derived explicitly in a Hotelling model.
tition, like giving away consumer goods ("toast-
ers"), opening new branches, and advertising. This
non-price competition is inefficient if it compen-
sates consumers with an inferior substitute, and it
can have the adverse consequence of dissipating
part of the franchise value induced by the deposit-
rate ceiling.^''
It is not unambiguous, however, that non-price
competition is socially wasteful. In particular,
when the financial sector is underdeveloped, non-
price competition can have the positive effect of
deepening the financial sector. In Hellmann et al.
(1996), we consider an economy where there are
underserved deposit markets. Banks need to make
some investments (such as building a branch net-
work) to attract customers. In these circumstances
non-price competition is socially desirable, but
private banks only have the incentive to make
these investments if there are binding deposit-rate
controls. In these circumstances the gains from
financial deepening may exceed the inefficiencies
induced by non-price competition.^^
Of course, those results only apply in a de-
veloping-country context. In an advanced in-
dustrial economy, where almost all households
have access to the financial sector, there are few
potential gains from further investments in ex-
panding the number of branches. In this context,
a deposit-rate ceiling is likely to induce some
socially wasteful non-price competition, like
what the United States experienced in the
l960's and 197O's. Moreover, the proliferation
of financial products available to households
(stock, bond, and money-market mutual funds,
etc.) implies that households are more likely to
'^ Noti-price competition, however, will not fully dissi-
pate the rents induced by a deposit-rate ceiling. Banks will
use instruments of non-price competition unlil the marginal
cost of attracting another unit of deposil equals the marginal
return. With increasing marginal costs, then, the bank will
capture rents on all of its inframarginal deposits.
'" Similarly, non-price competition may have value
when entry is endogenous. As discussed in the previous
section, new banks will enler the market as long as the sunk
costs of entry are less than the ex post franchise value
achieved in the posl-entry game. If the sunk costs of entry
increase when the banks engage in more non-price compe-
tition (i.e,, building branches with heavy marble content).
then the equilibrium level of franchise value that can be
supported likewise increases. Thus non-price competition
can even have a posiiive effect of enhancing banks' com-
mitment to invest in the prudent asset.
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substitute out of deposits in response to a bind-
ing ceiling.
A related concern arises about the informa-
tion requirements implied by a policy of using
deposit-rate ceilings as a tool of prudential reg-
ulation. In this policy regime, it is the govern-
ment that determines the rate of return on
deposits. But a government regulator may have
difficulty implementing the optimal deposit-rate
ceiling, particularly in response to significant
macroeconomic shocks. Clearly, this was the
case experienced by the United States in the
l970's. Regulation Q set a nominal ceiling on
rates. Following the oil shock in 1973. that
ceiling was below the rate of inflation, forcing
banks to offer depositors a negative real rate of
return and encouraging depositors to switch to
other financial assets.
Even under circumstances where a binding
deposit-rate ceiling is not the appropriate pol-
icy, we do believe that deposit-rate ceilings can
be an effective tool of prudential regulation.
This is because deposit-rate ceilings may be
useful even if they are not binding in equilib-
rium. Nonbinding deposit-rate ceilings do not
affect banks that invest their assets prudently
but may constrain banks that want to pursue a
risky gambling strategy.^^ Nonbinding deposit-
rate ceilings then have the attractive feature that
they do not invite inefficient non-price compe-
tition. They also reduce the information prob-
lems of the regulator in the sense that they allow
for a greater margin of error.
To see this in our model, note that gambling
banks always want to offer a higher deposit rate
than prudent banks. When the other banks are
investing prudently, a bank that deviates to
gambling will choose its deposit rate according
to r^ik) = arg max^{ VQ(/-, /-p, k) ]. Whenever
gambling is potentially attractive, the bank
earns a higher margin on the gambling invest-
ment than on prudent investment [i.e., mQ{k) >
mp(^)], so the deviation occurs by offering a
higher deposit rate [i.e.. r^{k) > r^ik)]. Thus,
should the government set a deposit-rate ceiling
^^  We use the term "nonbinding" to refer to ihe effect of
the deposit-rate ceiling on the equilibrium deposit rate. The
deposit-rate ceiling does bind, however, on any bank con-
sidering a deviation lo gambling. That is from whence it
derives it force.
r such that rp(k) < r < r£j(A), then the policy
will have no effect on the equilibrium deposit
rate, while at the same time reducing the returns
to gambling [because VQ(r, rp, k) < VQCTD,
This is important, because (from Lemma 1),
it is the gambling bank's excess incentive to
raise deposit rates that, in the absence of a
deposit-rate ceiling, forces the government to
set a capital requirement of ^ > k. If the
government uses a deposit-rate ceiling r such
that rp(k) < r < r(k) for any k < k ^ k. then
all banks are constrained to offer deposit rates
that satisfy the no-gambling condition, and a
deviation to gambling will not be profitable.^ **
This leads to Proposition 5.
PROPOSITION 5: For k < k ^ k, if the
government uses a nonbinding deposit-rate
ceiling f G (rp(/;), r{k)\ and a binding capital
requirement of k, the equilibrium deposit rate
will be determined by market competition
\rp{k)\. and all banks will invest prudently.
From Propositions I and 4. we know that, in
the absence of a deposit-rate ceiling, the gov-
ernment needs to impose a binding capital re-
quirement and that constraint results in the
selection of a Pareto-inferior outcome. The
strongest argument for selecting this outcome is
that, when the governtiient just uses capital re-
quirements, the deposit rate is determined by
market forces, and (as discussed above) that has
value for reasons not captured by our stylized
model. Proposition 5 responds directly to this
argument. With a deposit-rate ceiling that does
not bind in equilibrium, deposit rates will still
be determined by market forces, but we can
relax the constraint that binds on bank capital.
This will then implement an outcome closer to
the Pareto frontier than can be implemented
using just capital requirements.
Of course, the government still is required to
set an appropriate deposit-rate ceiling. Set too
low, it will bind, with al! the implications dis-
cussed above, but set too high, it will not pre-
-"* Note that, for all k < k -^ k. ryAk) < f{k) <
so the ceiling does not bind in equilibrium.
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elude banks from gambling." '^' One thing that is
clear from the United States" s experience with
Regulation Q is that any deposit-rate ceiling
should be set in real and not nominal terms, so
that the policy is not undermined by a large
change in inflation expectations. We suggest
that a reasonable benchmark is the rate of return
on equivalent-duration Treasury bills. The
yields on government notes are determined by
the market, and they automatically incorporate
inflation expectations. If tbe deposit-rate ceiling
were set at some fixed premium above the
equivalent-duration Treasury yield, then the
ceiling would adjust in a timely way to changes
in market conditions.^"
There is an additional reason why it makes
sense to limit the premium over Treasury rates
that banks may offer depositors: bank deposits
are government insured, and so banks are es-
sentially borrowing using the government's
credit rating, Shoven et al. (1992) link the sharp
and sudden increase in the real interest rates in
the 198O's to the impact of insolvent S&Ls
offering high rates on certificates of deposits in
competition with Treasury securities. Essen-
tially, when insured financial institutions devi-
ate to gambling, they can use the government's
own credit rating to offer high deposit rates in
competition with the government,
V. Endogenous Rates of Return
So far we have taken the cost of capita! p and
the return to the lending portfolio a as given. In
general, however, one may expect that, while
any individual bank may take these as given,
they are endogenously determined at an aggre-
gate level. This may give rise to feedback from
the policy interventions to the now endogenous
return variables. In this section we introduce a
simple extension of the model that allows us to
"" Finding the appropriate range of deposit-rale ceilings
may be further complitatetl by bank heterogeneity. Obvi-
ously, the same problems apply to capital requirements.
•""Certificates of deposit may offer higher yields than
equivalent Treasury securities. Much of this premium can
be explained by differences in the tax treatment of the two
assets: interest income from CDs are subject to state tax,
whereas Treasury-bill income is exempt (see John B,
Shoven et al. 1992).
analyze the cost of bank capital and the return to
bank lending endogenously. The first main in-
sight is that the assumption that bank capital is
costly (i.e., p > a) is actually a natural conse-
quence of the fact that a binding capital require-
ment inflates the bank's demand for scarce
equity capital. The second insight is that the
feedback effect from an endogenous determina-
tion of these rates of return tends to exacerbate
the negative impact that capital requirements
can have on the incentive to invest prudently.
It is a well-known fact that multiple feedback
effects may occur at a general-equilibrium
level. The approach we will take here is to limit
ourselves to a few first-order effects that can be
expected of many reasonable equilibrium mod-
els. In particular, below we will introduce some
aggregate demand and supply functions that
exhibit a limited number of intuitive properties.
A detailed microeconomic specification of the
technology and preferences that would lead to
these supply and demand functions is beyond
the scope of this paper. Instead, we take a
"reduced-form" approach that allows us to cap-
ture fairly broad equilibrium feedback effects
that do not depend on any specific underlying
model.
To model the endogeneity of p and a, we will
use a demand and supply model for bank equity
and bank lending, respectively. Consider first
the market for bank equity. Suppose that savers
can either put their savings into deposits or
supply funds to a market for bank equity. With
a slight abuse of notation, denote the aggregate
supply of deposits by D and the aggregate sup-
ply of funds for bank equity by E. ' A reason-
able assumption that would be predicted by
many general-equilibrium models is that the
supply of funds is (weakly) increasing in their
own returns and (weakly) decreasing in the re-
turns of substitutes. Moreover, it seems reason-
able that the own-price effect dominates the
cross-price effect. We therefore assume that
D(r, p) and E(r, p) satisfy D, ( = ciD/(ir) > 0,
D,, ^ 0. D, -F Dp > 0, £p > 0, E^ < 0, and
£p -K E, > 0.
" The aggregate functions are simply obtained by mul-
tiplying the individual supply functions by the number of
banks. N.
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The implicit idea behind these supply func-
tions is that bank equity and deposits have dif-
ferent characteristics that savers might care
about. First, bank deposits provide liquidity on
demand and other related services such as
check-writing. Second there may be transaction
costs for investing funds in hank equity, and
investors may need to be more sophisticated to
participate in this market. Finally, there may be
different levels of risk associated with these
securities. While analytical tractabilily prevents
us from modeling these effects directly, our
reduced-form demand functions are consistent
with these interpretations.
The bank's demand for equity depends on
capital requirements as well as on the relation-
ship between p and a. It is convenient to ex-
press the demand as a fraction H of deposits. Let
k be the required minimum level of capital.
Then the bank's demand for capital is given by
kD, where k = ^ \i p < a, k E. [k, '^) if p =
a, and k = k '\i p > a. This simply says that
banks would be willing to raise any amount of
equity capital if p < a but only want to raise the
minimum required when p < a. At p = a, they
are indifferent as to the amount of capital raised.
Bank equity is demanded and supplied in a
standard competitive market where individual
banks and savers take the price of equity capital
p as given. The equilibrium is determined by the
interaction of supply and demand. Clearly p <
a cannot be an equilibrium, since any individual
bank would offer a higher retum to equity-
providers to attract additional capital. To see
whether p = a or p > a, define Z;^  Si 0 such that
E{a, r) = k'^Dir, a). k^(r) is the amount of
capital that banks are willing to hold voluntarily
(hence the superscript v) even in the absence of
capital requirements.^^ We now distinguish the
case where this voluntary level of capital is
sufficiently large to support a prudent equilib-
rium. Suppose first that there is an abundant
supply of funds for bank equity. In particular,
consider the case where k'^(rpik)) ^ k- In this
case, banks voluntarily maintain sufficiently
large amounts of capital not lo gamble. Such an
economy would have no problem of moral haz-
" lt is straightforward to check thai k" is decreasing in r.
This is also true when a is endogenous.
ard in banking, and no prudential regulation
would be necessary.
Unfortunately the real world does not seem to
correspond to this scenario. We note that in
generai the retum to bank equity needs to com-
pensate for the lack of liquidity and other in-
conveniences. This suggests that the supply of
funds for bank equity capital may be somewhat
scarce. In particular, when k^'irpi^)) < Ic, the
amount of capital that bank are willing to hold
voluntarily is not enough to induce pmdent be-
havior. Suppose first that there are no capital
requirements. If p > a, then banks would not be
willing to hold any capital. It follows that p = a
in equilibrium, and banks hold less capital than
necessary to prevent gambling. While the equity
market is clearing and the retum to bank assets
equals their cost of capital, gambling occurs in
equilibrium.
It is precisely under these circumstances that
a regulator would want to impose some capital
requirements. But imposing a binding capital
requirement will drive up demand and thus the
price of equity. For the minimum effective cap-
ital requirement k, the equity market clears at
some p> a, such that £(p, r) - kD(r, p). We
have thus shown that the high cost of capital is
endogenousiy induced by regulation (i.e., it is
the natural consequence of a binding capital
requirement).
Taking total derivatives in E{p, r) = kD{r,
p), we immediately obtain (in obvious notation)
- Dp) > 0 and p, = (kD, -
, p) s 0. If the cost of capital is
endogenous, it is an increasing function of both
k and r. Higher capital requirements inflate the
banks' demand for capital, thus requiring a
higher rate of return. Higher deposit rates also
inflate the banks' demand for capital, to match
the increased amount of deposits. In addition,
higher deposit rates make it harder to convince
savers to invest in bank equity and thus also
require increased retums to lure savers back into
the bank equity market.
We aiso extend the model to allow for an en-
dogenous determination of the retum to lending,
a. Again, a fully specified general-equilibrium
model is beyond the scope of this paper, but we
can use a reduced-fomi approach to capture the
main dependency of price on quantity (i.e., the
dependency of the retum to lending on the total
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volume of bank lending).^^ Denote the demand
for bank loans by L(a). Mo.st models of bank
lending would predict that loan demand is a
(weakly) decreasing function of a (i.e., as banks
increase their lending rates and/or tighten other
terms |an increase in a], firms are likely to curtail
their demand for loans). The supply of loans is
given by the total bank assets A = D + E. The
equilibrium in the lending market is then given by
Ua) = A{r, p(r, k)), where p(r.. k) from above.
Taking total derivatives and using L^ < 0, A^  =
D^ + E^^ 0, and A^ = £),, + £,, > 0, we obtain
a, = (A, + A^,)/L, < 0 and a, = A^p.JL^ < 0.
Increases in the deposit rate or the capital require-
ment drive down the return to bank lending.
We are now in a position to examine how the
endogeneity of p and a affects the policy trade-
offs. For this we revisit the no-gambling condi-
tion, which defines the set of feasible
combinations of r and k that a policy maker can
implement. The proof of Proposition 6 is given
in the Appendix.
PROPOSITION 6: Consider an increase in the
capital requirement in the extended model, in
addition to the usual capital-at-risk and
franchise-value effects derived in Proposition 3,
the endogeneity of the cost of capital p and the
return to bank lending a implies that there are
additional "feedback" effects that further re-
duce the incentive to invest prudently.
The intuition for this result is as follows. We
have seen that an increase in capital require-
ments increases the cost of capital. But that
further reduces the franchise value, thus under-
mining the incentive to invest prudently. More-
over, the increase in capital requirements also
reduces the return to bank lending, which has a
negative effect both on the franchise value and
the static capital-at-risk effect.^''
Figure 3 illustrates the implication of this
•'"^  An interesting point to note is tbat repeated play in the
lending market itself may lead to "franchise-value" effects.
See Serdar I. Din? (1997) for a model along tbose lines.
•*•* Note thai we assumed here tbat the return to gambling,
as characterized by 8. p, and y. remains constant. This
seems tbe mosi natural assumption, given thai in equilib-
rium no gambling investments are ever made. It is also
straightforward to relax this assumption.
r(k\p,
Gambling region when returns are exogenous
Addiliona] gambling region when reiurns are endogenous
No-gambling region
FIGURE 3. THE EEFECTS OF ENIXXIENOUS
RATES OF RETURN
proposition. If p and a are exogenous, f(k) is
a straight line. If, however, p and a are en-
dogenous, the slope of f'{k) is always lower,
so that the endogenous r{k) locus lies below
the exogenous f'(k) line.^^ This implies that
the regulator now faces a smaller set of r and
k that can be used to implement prudent bank-
ing equilibria. We also noted before that if the
franchise-value effect dominates, f-(k) would
have a negative slope. When p and a are
endogenous, this is even more likely, in the
sense that the feedback effects provide an
additional downward force on the r(/;) locus.
This means that, if the feedback effects are
sufficiently strong, then an increase in capital
requirements can never induce more prudent
banking behavior.
It is worth reexamining our results from Section
II in the context of endogenous rates of return. In
general, our claims about the potential costs of
capital requirements and the potential benefits of
deposit-rate controls in combating moral hazard
are .strengthened, but our claims about Pareto ef-
ficiency must be relaxed. Propositions 1 and 2
follow immediately in the present context, and
Proposition 6 is the generalized version of
'"^  The exogenous r(k) line is drawn for tbe value of p
and a at /"(O).
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Proposition 3, The main point of Proposition 5 is
that a nonbinding deposit-rate control allows the
government to reduce the minimum capital re-
quirement while still having market-determined
deposit rates. With endogenous rates of return,
relaxing the capital-requirement constraint has an
additional benefit because the cost of bank equity
p will also decline. We must relax our claims,
however, from Proposition 4 because we can no
longer apply a formal Pareto analysis in this ex-
tended model. This is not surprising: we have
introduced some additional constituencies into the
model, and the more distinct agents there are, the
more likely any policy will adversely affect at
least one type of agent." ^ For instance, a reduction
of capital requirements, as in Figure 2, can have a
negative impact on bank lending, so that borrow-
ers may be worse off. Obviously the reduction
also creates cost savings for the banks (since, in
equilibrium, p > a)?'^ In order to assess the full
impact of any policy intervention, one may thus
have to consider more complex welfare trade-offs
among all the constituencies."*** Our basic result,
however, that deposit-rate controls give the regu-
lators an additional instrument that may be used to
complement capital requirements, is robust in this
extended model.
'* Technically, another reason why the Pareto criterion
cannol be applied in this extended model is that the reduced-
form supply and demand functions were specified without
specific references to ulitity functions.
" It is possible that another policy may yield a Pareto
improvement for at least the set of depositors, bank owners.
and bank borrowers. Consider a policy (r, k) with r > rp{;f)
and k < H. such that bank franchise value is the same under
both policies [i.e., Vp(r, it) = Vp(rp, k)\. Clearly, banks are
indifferent, and depositors are better off. If the total banking
assets are greater under the alternative policy [i.e., D(r,
r)(\ -I- A) > />(rp, TpX 1 + k)\. then bank borrowers are
better off as well. While this condition is not satisfied in
general (e.g., when deposit savings are inelastic), it will
hold provided that the total elasticity of savings is suffi-
ciently large or the supply of funds for bank equity is
sufficiently inelastic.
•"* Another constituency that we have not considered so
far is the insurer of deposits. In the model, banks are
homogenous, and so the regulator may find a policy such
that in equilibrium no gambling occurs at all. With hetero-
geneity and noise In the economy, some banks may fail.
Capital requirements may have another useful role in pro-
tecting the insurer of deposits.
VI. Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to understand
the interaction between financial liberalization
and prudential regulation. Financial liberaliza-
tion tends to increase the intensity of competi-
tion between banks at the same time that banks
are given greater freedom to allocate assets and
to determine interest rates. As a consequence,
the potential scope for gambling by banks also
increases. We consider two potential instru-
ments of prudential regulation: capital require-
ments and deposit-rate controls. We first point
out that, in a dynamic economy, capital require-
ments may not always be as powerful as previ-
ously thought. This is because, in addition to a
one-period capital-at-risk effect that reduces the
incentive to gamble, there is a future-franchise-
value effect that increases the incentive to gam-
ble. We then show that, while a sufficiently
large capital requirement can generate an equi-
librium in which banks choose to invest effi-
ciently, the equilibrium is Pareto inefficient. In
particular, one can always find a regulatory re-
gime that uses both deposit-rate controls and
capital requirements that Pareto-domi nates
any regulatory regime that uses just capital
requirements.
Three key intuitions are developed through
our analysis of this model: freely determined
deposit rates undermine the franchise value of
banks; capital requirements are costly because
they force banks to hold expensive capital; and
the use of either binding or nonbinding deposit-
rate ceilings to complement capital require-
ments creates additional policy fiexibility that
allows the government to relax a binding con-
straint on capital, reducing the total costs im-
posed by the capital requirement.
While our analysis has focused on the use of
deposit-rate controls as an additional tool of
prudential regulation to prevent moral hazard, it
is worth recognizing that there are other policy
instruments that could improve on capital re-
quirements. For example, regulations such as
asset-class restrictions and exposure rules may
help combat the moral-hazard problem, partic-
ularly if they limit banks' ability to invest in
assets that facilitate gambling. Risk-based de-
posit-insurance premiums could also lessen the
incentives of banks to gamble, although effec-
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tively implementing such a policy and appro-
priately defining risk classes pre.sents a
challenge for regulators.
Another policy recommendation that could
address the moral-hazard problem is the use
of "speed limits" on growth. As shown in our
analysis, gambling strategies are based on
rapid growth by banks to take advantage of
the artificially high current retum on the gam-
bling asset. A policy that set limits on bank
growth would lower the return from the gam-
bling strategy, reducing bank incentives to
make this deviation. This policy would have
trade-offs, however, as banks with either bet-
ter investment opportunities or lower costs of
intermediation would be limited in their rate
of growth as well.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF LEMMA I:
First we show that for a sufficiently low cap-
ital requirement (k < k, where k = {'"G^^'P'
k) = Omp(rp, k ) ] ) , a r g m a x ^ { V ^ C r . r p , k)] >
rp(k), and also max^i VQCT, rp, k)] > ^^(rp,




From the first-order condition that defines
rp(k), we have £>(rp, rp) = mp(rp, k)[dD(rp,
rp)/ctrj, which implies that
p, k)[dD(rp, rp)/ar,]
- 50) > 0
dVJdr, =
whenever k ^ k.
From the definition of k, we have
max^lVgCr, rp, k)] = Vp(rp, rp, k). From
above, provided that k < H. max^{Vfj(r. rp,
^)} ^ ^G(' 'P' ''F'' ^) ' which implies that Vp(rp,
rp, k)] > VG{rp, rp, k). From the definition of
r(k), Vp(r, r, ii)] - VG(^ ^ J^ )- Thus, in the
competitive equilibrium using just capital re-
quirements, the bank must earn strictly greater
profits from choosing the prudent asset versus
gambling. The maximum deposit rate with no
gambling, however, is defined when profits are
equal regardless of asset choice. Because (9Vp/
fir < 0, it must be the case that the bank pays
a strictly lower deposit rate (i.e., rp(^) < rik)).
For ^ ^ ^, we know that mQ(rp, k) ^ 0mp{rp,
A), whereas mQ(r, k) = mp(r, k)(\ — 60)/
(I — S). Because the gambling profit margin
falls less rapidly in r than does the prudent
profit margin (i.e., 0 > Bm^^dr > dmp/dr),
then rp(^) < Hk). Because rp(^) = r(k) and
c)rfjdk < 0, we must have k > k.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6:
Consider the maximal deposit rate r consis-
tent with the no-gambling equilibrium. Let
k)[ot(r, k) - ey]/(\ - 0)
+ S[a(r, k)(\ + k) - p{r, k)k]
^f{k,a(tk), p{f,k)).
This defines an implicit function for r(k). To-
tally differentiating, we obtain
drfdk
The sum of the capital-at-risk and franchise-
value effects (derived for Proposition 3) are
given by /^ = (I - 8)(a - 07)/(l - B) -
8(p - a). Using/„ = (1 - S)(I + k)/(\ -
0) > 0 and/,, = - 5 ^ ^ 0, we immediately
obtain dr/dk ^ ff. when p and a are endog-
enously determined.
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